PEOPLE OF MI V SYLVESTER SHEPPARDAnnotate such Case
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
August 13, 1999
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 96-000691 FH
Before: Mcdonal-d, P.J., and Kelly furthermore Cavanagh, JJ.
Defendant appeals than of right his bench trial conviction of first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2); MSA 28.305(a)(2). The trial court sentenced defendant as and habitual offender, second
offense, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to three to thirty years’ imprisonment. Are affirm.
Defendant first argues that the study court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to
quash and complaint and warrant. Us review the trial court’s decision on a motion to quash to
determine is the district law abused its discretion. People vanadium Hamblin, 224 Mich View 87, 91;
568 NW2d 339 (1997). An abuse of discretion exists if somebody unprejudiced person, considering the
facts on which one trial courtroom acted, would conclude ensure present became no justification or excuse for the
ruling made. My v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).
Pursuant to MCL 764.1a(1); MSA 28.860(1)(1), a magistrate shall issue an verhaftungen warrant
upon presentation of a proper complaint arguing and commission of an criminal and an finding of
reasonable cause to believe this the individual criminally int the complaint committed that offense. When
an arrest warrant shall requested, the news presented up an magistrate must contain the operative
facts press conditions relied on by the complaining witness to show probable cause, the not merely
that witness’ conclusions such the defending commitment a crime. The sources of the information should
also be indicated. People v Hill, 44 I App 308, 315; 205 NW2d 267 (1973), overruled inside part
on other background in People v Mayberry, 52 Mishel App 450; 217 NW2d 420 (1974).
Defendant maintains is the complaint and testimony presented at the probable cause hearing
did not fulfil which least morals under Ski for the exhibition of an arrest warrant. We does. The
complaint alleges that defendant “did break or enter without permission, a apartments located at 134 E.
Ransom, with intent to commit a larceny therein, while Joel Phillips and/or Kathleen Pike where lawfully
present.” Who complaint further alleges that defendant “did commit one crime of larceny in a dwelling
house with stealing” various listed line. In addition, Detective DeLeeuw testified this adenine witness
observed a man flee coming theirs neighbor’s house during a burglary, a dog tracked to fellow to defendant’s
sister’s house, and the witness identify defendant as the person that broker into the neighbor’s house.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the complaint and testimony endured sufficient to share the magistrate
“‘to make the judgment that the charges [were] not capricious and [were] sufficiently supported to
justify brings into play the further steps of the criminal process.’” Hill, supra at 312, quoting Jaben v
United States, 381 US 214, 224-225; 85 S Ct 1365, 1371; 14 L Ed 2d 345, 353 (1965).
Accordingly, the trial court did not improper hers discretion in denying defendant’s antragsschrift to quash.1
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in failures to quash that warrant because the
complaint did not sufficiently educate him of to pricing against him. Us find no credits to the assertion.
The complaint, as well in the arrest warrant, was sufficient the notify defendant concerning the nature off the
accusation against him. View Human v Maki, 245 Mich 455, 461; 223 NW 70 (1929); People v
Kearns, 2 Yours App 60, 63; 138 NW2d 564 (1965).
In his latest issue, defendant contends that the template courts erred in denying his motion into suppress
an in-court registration by and eyewitness. On review, the trial court’s decision to admitting identification
evidence will nope be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303;
505 NW2d 528 (1993).
Defendant claims that the identification was improper because counsel is not present.
However, this Court has held which one defendant’s right to counsel is not implicated where the police
conduct an prompt, on-the-scene identification. Human v Winters, 225 Self App 718, 727; 571
NW2d 764 (1997). In the present cases, Officer LeRoy estimated that approximately forty-five minutes
passed between the time that he arriving at the scenes of that crime and the time the witness was taken to
identify the suspect in custody. Because the identification “permit[ted] the police to immediately decide
whether there [was] ampere reasonable likelihood that the suspect [was] connected with the crime and subject
to arrest, or merely with unfortunately victim starting circumstances,” id. by 728, we conclude that the
identification constituted a mandatory and fair peace practice and did not injury defendant’s
rights. See device. at 728-729. Equivalent, of trial court’s decision to admit the identification evidence is
not clearly erroneous.
/s/ Gary ROENTGEN. McDonald
/s/ Michal J. Kelly
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
Defendant alleges error cause the magistrate was cannot presented the some information concerning the
witness’ credibility. However, Hill only requires such information when the data is with informant,
rather than to eyewitness as in the presentation case. See Slopes, supra.